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INTERROGATION UNDER THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT: ARIZONA V. MAURO
illiam Carl Mauro went to the local discount store and told em-
ployees that he had just killed his son. The employees called the
police to report the crime. Mauro told the police he had murdered
his son and took them to the location of his child's body. The police at that
point arrested Mauro and read him his constitutional rights as required
under Miranda v. Arizona.' Mauro elected to remain silent until he could
speak with his attorney. The police asked him no further questions.
The police simultaneously questioned Mauro's wife about the death of her
son. During this questioning she asked to see her husband. The police were
reluctant to allow her to talk with Mauro, but she continued to insist until
the police allowed the meeting.
The police agreed that Mrs. Mauro could talk with her husband only if a
police officer with a tape recorder was present. The officer placed the tape
recorder on the table in plain view to record the conversation. During this
conversation Mauro incriminated himself.
The prosecutor sought to introduce the tape recording at trial as evidence
that Mauro was sane at the time of the killing in order to rebut Mauro's
claim of insanity. Mauro attempted to suppress the evidence, claiming the
police acquired it in violation of his Miranda rights. The lower court in
Arizona admitted the recorded statement against Mauro to rebut his claim
of insanity. Subsequently, the lower court convicted Mauro of child abuse
and first degree murder.
The Arizona Supreme Court reversed the conviction based upon the
court's interpretation of Rhode Island v. Innis.2 The Arizona Supreme
Court determined that the conversation between Mauro and his wife oc-
curred in a situation likely to elicit an incriminating response from the sus-
pect and thus constituted the functional equivalent of interrogation under
the analysis of Innis.3 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
to clarify the meaning of interrogation and its functional equivalent as set
1. 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966). For a discussion of Miranda rights, see infra notes 22-37
and accompanying text.
2. 446 U.S. 291 (1980). The Court in Innis defined interrogation to include both express
questioning and "any words or actions on the part of police... that the police should know
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Id. at 301; see State
v. Mauro, 149 Ariz. 24, 716 P.2d 393, 400 (1986) (en banc).
3. Mauro 716 P.2d at 400. In making its determination, the Arizona court looked solely
at the intent of the police. Id. The Arizona court compared a suspect's right to silence until he
speaks with an attorney under the fifth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. V, with a suspect's
right to an attorney under the sixth amendment, U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. 716 P.2d at 401; see
Innis, 446 U.S. at 301.
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forth in Innis. Held, reversed: The police conduct was not sufficient to con-
stitute interrogation or its functional equivalent under Innis since the police
did not initiate the meeting between Mr. and Mrs. Mauro, but merely al-
lowed the meeting to occur. Arizona v. Mauro, 107 S. Ct. 1931, 95 L. Ed. 2d
458 (1987).
I. DEVELOPMENT OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT
AGAINST INTERROGATION
A. Interrogation and the Fifth Amendment Right
Against Self-Incrimination
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution4 gives each person
the right not to incriminate himself in a criminal trial. The constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination extends to defendants in state as well as
federal criminal trials.5 Under the exclusionary rule, evidence obtained in
violation of a suspect's right to remain silent is not admissible in court.
6
If a defendant voluntarily confesses, however, the prosecutor may use the
confession against the defendant. 7 The Supreme Court held in Bram v.
United States8 that a court can admit a confession as evidence against a per-
son only if the person has voluntarily confessed. 9 According to Bram a con-
fession is not voluntary if under the given facts and circumstances the
suspect would have remained quiet, but for the compelling influence of the
police.' 0 ,
After Brain the Supreme Court inquired into the "totality of the circum-
stances" to decide whether to admit evidence of incriminating statements
that defendants had made. I I The Court took a case-by-case approach in
deciding whether the suspect voluntarily confessed. The Court balanced the
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself .... ").
5. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1963). The fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination applies to state court proceedings through the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall... deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... .
6. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
7. Id. at 478 ("Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influ-
ences is, of course, admissible in evidence.").
8. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
9. Id. at 549. The Court in Brain established the standard to determine if a statement is
"voluntary." Id. The Court inquires not whether the statement was voluntary, but whether
the defendant voluntarily made the statement. Id.
10. Id.
11. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 441 (1974) (voluntariness depends on whether po-
lice treated suspect in unfair or unreasonable manner in order to get incriminating statement);
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 322-23 (1959) (police interrogation that continued through
the night coupled with interrogation by friend using emotional appeal in order to persuade
defendant to confess violated defendant's fourteenth amendment rights). "Totality of circum-
stances" test means that a court must examine all the factors of the interrogation examined
separately and as a whole. F. INBAU, J. REID & J. BUCKLEY, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION
AND CONFESSIONS 243 (3d ed. 1986). Even if each factor alone is not sufficient to prove the
suspect made the statement involuntarily, all the factors together may show the suspect spoke
involuntarily. Id. at 325; see R. ROYAL & S. SCHUTr, THE GENTLE ART OF INTERVIEWING
AND INTERROGATION 117 (1976) ("[A] strong influence will produce a strong reaction and a
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needs of law enforcement to prevent criminal activity against the constitu-
tional rights of the defendant.1
2
B. Interrogation and the Sixth Amendment Right to Representation
When police arrest a suspect, that suspect potentially has a constitutional
right not only under the fifth amendment, but also under the sixth amend-
ment.1 3 Once the rights attach, unless the suspect waives those rights, the
police cannot interrogate the suspect. 14 In Massiah v. United States IS the
Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment prevented the use of incrimi-
nating statements that the police had obtained from the defendant without
his knowledge after his indictment for an offense.' 6 The Court extended its
interpretation of interrogation to include information that police gathered
secretly from the defendant.' 7 The Court held that the sixth amendment
right of representation by counsel applied not only during a criminal trial,
but also during the period preceding a trial when the investigation began to
focus on the accused.' 8 In Escobedo v. Illinois'9 the Supreme Court ex-
panded its holding in Massiah, ruling that the defendant had the sixth
amendment right to counsel even before the prosecution obtained an indict-
ment.20 According to the Court, when an investigation focuses on an indi-
vidual suspect, that suspect has the right under the sixth amendment to have
an attorney present during questioning.21
weak influence, a weak reaction. Of equal significance, a strong effect can be produced by an
accumulation of small influences.").
12. Spano, 360 U.S. at 315.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("[T]he accused shall ... have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defense."). A person has a fifth amendment right against self-incrimination immediately
upon arrest but not before arrest during general questioning. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 477 (1966). A person has the sixth amendment right to counsel once he is under indict-
ment. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964).
14. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
15. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
16. Id. at 206.
17. Id. at 205. In Massiah the police placed a radio transmitter in a car belonging to a
friend of the defendant. The friend, who had knowledge of the transmitter, turned the conver-
sation to the defendant's indictment, and the defendant made incriminating statements that the
police heard over the radio.
18. Id. at 204 (police obtained incriminating statements after defendant's indictment but
before his trial).
19. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
20. Id. at 485-86. The Supreme Court has held in subsequent cases, however, that the
Escobedo case applies to the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination, rather than to
the sixth amendment right to counsel. Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1145-46, 89 L. Ed. 2d
410, 426 (1986) ("[The Miranda Court's] brief observation about the reach of Escobedo's Sixth
Amendment analysis is not only dictum, but reflects an understanding of [Escobedo] that the
Court has expressly disavowed."); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (basis of Esco-
bedo was the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384
U.S. 719, 729 (1966) ("the prime purpose [of Escobedo] is to guarantee... the privilege against
self-incrimination").
21. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 492. The Court noted:
No system worth preserving should have to fear that if an accused is permitted
to consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and exercise, [his constitu-
tional] rights. If the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness
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C. Miranda Requirements for Interrogation
The prior cases set the stage for Miranda v. Arizona,22 a landmark deci-
sion. Miranda, Escobedo, and Massiah all dealt with the admissibility of
incriminating statements that suspects made during interrogation. 23 The
Supreme Court decided Escobedo and Massiah based on the suspect's sixth
amendment right to an attorney during interrogation. 24 The Supreme Court
based the Miranda decision on the fifth amendment right against self-incrim-
ination.25 In the Miranda decision, however, the Supreme Court espoused
the same principles that the Court enunciated in Escobedo.26
The Court in Miranda required that police advise suspects of their consti-
tutional rights when police place them in custody. 27 Under Miranda the
police must give the suspect four warnings: that he can remain silent, that
anything he says can be used against him, that he has a right to have an
attorney, and that the state will appoint an attorney if the suspect cannot
afford one.28 A suspect can invoke his Miranda rights at any time before or
during interrogation. 29 A suspect can voluntarily waive his rights under Mi-
of a system of law enforcement, then there is something very wrong with that
system.
Id. at 490 (emphasis in original).
22. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Supreme Court consolidated four cases in which police
obtained confessions from each of the defendants during "incommunicado interrogation... in
a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements without full warn-
ings of constitutional rights." Id. at 445. The Court noted that it was not creating new rights
for accused persons, but merely applying principles that the Constitution had established. Id.
at 442. A full discussion of the issues presented in Miranda and the effects of that decision on
the criminal justice system is beyond the scope of this Note. See generally Ogletree, Are Con-
fessions Really Good for the Soul?: A Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1826, 1839-42 (1987) (Burger Court and Rehnquist Court have chipped away at Miranda
doctrine, endangering suspects' constitutional rights); White, Defending Miranda: A Reply to
Professor Caplan, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1, 9 (1986) ("Miranda rests on a legitimate constitutional
basis. The Miranda rule represents an effort to apply the fifth amendment privilege to a vital
state of the adversary process."). But see F. INBAU, J. REID & J. BUCKLEY, supra note 11, at
279 (current police practices have gone too far beyond the scope of Miranda and provide more
than the constitutional right against self-incrimination); Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38
VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1467 (1985) (courts must balance suspects' rights under Miranda against
need for proper law enforcement).
23. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439; Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 479, Massiah, 377 U.S. at 202.
24. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 490-91; Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206.
25. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 479. The four warnings on the constitutional right against self-incrimination
that the police must give to a suspect before any questioning occurs are:
[T]hat he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used
against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attor-
ney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior
to any questioning if he so desires.
Id. Police read these rights to a suspect from a card that often includes a fifth warning, such as
the following: "You can decide at any time to exercise these rights and not answer any ques-
tions or make any statements." F. INBAU, J. REID & J. BUCKLEY, supra note 11, at 221. The
authors consider the fifth warning "gratuitous." Id. The Miranda opinion itself adds that a
person can exercise his right at any point, but does not require that police give a fifth warning.
384 U.S. at 478-79.
29. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
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randa and speak to the police about the alleged crime.30 He can also rescind
the waiver at any time and refuse to speak further to the police until his
attorney is present. 31
The Supreme Court in Miranda established a comprehensive protection of
a suspect's rights. Prior to Miranda the Court decided many of the interro-
gation cases on a case-by-case basis. 32 The Supreme Court in Miranda es-
tablished a framework that would apply to all future cases by delineating a
suspect's rights and defining the circumstances under which those rights
would apply.33 The rule of Miranda, however, does not apply to general
questioning at the scene of a crime or to statements that persons not in cus-
tody voluntarily make.34 Instead, the Court limited the rule to interrogation
of persons in police custody.3 5 The Supreme Court rejected the theory that a
court should balance the needs of law enforcement to prevent criminal activ-
ity against the constitutional rights of the defendant. 36
D. Defining Interrogation
The Supreme Court originally defined interrogation in Miranda v. Ari-
zona.37 In Brewer v. Williams 3 8 the Court addressed the issue of whether
the police had interrogated the suspect and reestablished the validity of Mas-
siah v. United States,39 a pre-Miranda case. The Williams Court held that
the police had interrogated the defendant after he had invoked his right to
remain silent and that he had not waived this right.4° The Court decided the
case based not on Miranda, but on the defendant's sixth amendment right to
30. Id. To be effective, the waiver must be "made voluntarily, knowingly and intelli-
gently." Id. at 444; see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). The Supreme Court in
Miranda pointed out that "[violunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth
Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today." 384 U.S. at 478.
31. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445.
32. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321 (1959) (disallowing confession based on
totality of circumstances); Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 548-49 (1897) (admitting a
confession into evidence if defendant makes it voluntarily).
33. 384 U.S. at 444-45.
34. Id. at 478.
35. Id. The Supreme Court stated: "By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning ini-
tiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id. at 444.
36. Id. at 479.
37. Id. at 444. Royal and Schutt define interrogation as "examin[ing a person] formally
and officially by the use of questioning and persuasion for the purpose of inducing a person to
reveal intentionally concealed information." R. ROYAL & S. SCHuTr, supra note 11, at 116.
38. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
39. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). Even though the Court decided that police were interrogating
Williams at the time he made his confession, id. at 206, the finding was unnecessary to the
sixth amendment holding in the case. Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda:
What Is "Interrogation"? When Does It Matter?, 67 GEO. L.J. 1, 41 (1978). Massiah applies to
sixth amendment cases, while Escobedo and Miranda apply to fifth amendment cases. Id. at
24-27.
40. 430 U.S. at 400. The Supreme Court held that police had interrogated Williams when
the police officer who knew of Williams's religious beliefs and his mental instability told Wil-
liams that it was a shame that the parents would be unable to give their little girl, whom
Williams had allegedly murdered, a Christian burial. Id. Williams allegedly abducted the girl
on December 24 and this conversation occurred on December 26.
19881 NOTES 1263
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
have an attorney present during the interrogation. 4' The Supreme Court
implied by its holding in this case that both the fifth amendment and the
sixth amendment constitutional rights apply to interrogations. 42
Although the Court addressed the issue of whether the police interrogated
the suspect in Williams, it did not fully discuss the question of what consti-
tutes interrogation until Rhode Island v. Innis.43 In Innis the Supreme
Court defined interrogation to include not only direct questioning by the
police after they have taken the suspect into custody, but also other conduct
that is "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the sus-
pect." 44 The Court established a foreseeability test to determine if the police
had interrogated a suspect. 45 A court must determine whether the police
knew or should have known that their conduct was reasonably likely to
cause the suspect to incriminate himself.46 The Supreme Court developed
three considerations to use to determine if the police conduct was improper.
First, a court must primarily view the situation from the perspective of the
suspect.47 Second, a court should determine the police officer's intent with
respect to the conduct, including whether the police should have foreseen
the likelihood of an incriminating response.48 A court should look at what
the police knew about the particular suspect and the suspect's unusual char-
acteristics. 49 Third, a court should apply a standard of reasonableness to
determine whether the conduct was likely to elicit an incriminating
statement.50
The Court held that the police did not interrogate Innis based on the three
considerations cited. 5' In Innis the Court established a line of demarcation
41. Id. at 405-06.
42. But see Kamisar, supra note 40, at 3-4 (courts must decide interrogation issue in fifth
amendment case, but not in sixth amendment case).
43. 446 U.S. 291 (1980). In Innis the police had arrested the suspect and were transport-
ing him to the police station when two of the police officers in the car began conversing with
each other about the danger of an abandoned shotgun to handicapped children in the area on
their way to school. The suspect overheard the conversation and within a few minutes told the
officers to turn the car around so he could retrieve the gun.
44. Id. at 300-01. Justices Marshall and Brennan, who dissented in the case, agreed fully
with the definition of interrogation, but disagreed with the application of that definition to the
facts of the case. Id. at 305 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 302. The Court stated:
A practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incrimi-
nating response from a suspect amounts to interrogation. But, since the police
surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or
actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on
the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response.
Id. at 301-02 (emphasis in original).
46. Id. at 301.
47. Id. The Innis Court emphasized that the primary concern of the Miranda opinion
was the coercion and compulsion that accompanies custodial interrogation. Id. As a result, a
court must focus primarily on the perception of the suspect to determine if police conduct
amounts to interrogation. Id. at 300-01.
48. Id. at 301-02.
49. Id. at 302.
50. Id. at 302-03.
51. Id. at 303-04.
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between sixth amendment cases, such as Williams, and fifth amendment
cases, to which Miranda applies. 52 Even though the facts of Williams were
very similar to those in Innis,5a the Court pointed out that the policies un-
derlying the fifth and sixth amendments are very dissimilar.54
In Innis all the Justices of the Supreme Court except one" agreed on the
definition of interrogation. The eight Justices disagreed, however, on the
application of that definition to the facts of the case. 56 The majority deter-
mined that the police officers could not foresee that Innis would respond to
the police officer's statements, while the three dissenting Justices believed the
officers should have foreseen that Innis was likely to respond under the facts
presented. This conflict created ambiguity for lower courts attempting to
determine whether interrogation existed in a given case. 57 A panel of the
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Thierman 58 disagreed among themselves in
52. Id. at 300 n.4. The Court could have decided Williams based on the fifth amendment
and Miranda, but chose instead to use the sixth amendment. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.
387, 397-98 (1977). The Court still addressed the issue of whether the police had interrogated
Williams. Id. at 400; see F. INBAU, J. REID & J. BUCKLEY, supra note 11, at 237 (Williams
Court applied functional-equivalent-of-interrogation test from Miranda); Kamisar, supra note
40, at 63-69 (while fifth amendment requires safeguards for custodial interrogation, sixth
amendment requires that suspect have right to have attorney present during any interrogation
after indictment). A court following Miranda and the fifth amendment must inquire whether
the police interrogated a suspect while in custody. Presumably, if an undercover police agent
talks to a suspect who is in custody, the Supreme Court would not hold that police had interro-
gated the suspect if the suspect was unaware that the agent was a police officer. Id. at 67-69.
Under the sixth amendment, once the grand jury indicts a suspect, any police conduct to
obtain information directly from the suspect violates the sixth amendment. Id. at 66-67.
53. The police in Williams talked to the suspect even after warning him that he did not
have to respond, while in Innis the two police officers spoke only to each other. Moreover, the
police in Williams knew they could appeal to the suspect's religion, while the police in Innis
did not attempt to appeal psychologically to the suspect to obtain information. "The essential
factual difference between Innes [sic] and Williams was, of course, that in the latter, the com-
ment was made to the suspect; whereas in Innes, [sic] it was made to a fellow officer." F.
INBAU, J. REID & J. BUCKLEY, supra note 11, at 238. Appeals to conscience are a classic
interrogation technique. Id. at 78.
54. The fifth amendment provides that a suspect has a constitutional privilege not to in-
criminate himself in a criminal proceeding. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Since the courts have
viewed the custodial environment as inherently disfavoring the suspect, it has required strict
guidelines for police to follow in interrogating suspects in order to protect the fifth amendment
privilege. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966); see Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S.
291, 300-02 (1980) (defining the functional equivalent of interrogation). The sixth amendment
provides that an accused has the right to representation by an attorney. U.S. CONsT. amend
VI. Since the period after indictment and before trial 'is as critical to the accused's defense as
the trial itself, the suspect needs representation then as well. Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201, 205 (1964). Courts have interpreted the sixth amendment as requiring that the ac-
cused after indictment has the right to have his attorney present for direct or indirect questions
and forbidding the police from secretly acquiring information from the accused. Id. at 206.
55. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 311 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
56. Id at 305 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
57. See United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368, 379 (10th Cir. 1985) (suspect making incrimi-
nating remark when police picked up object not interrogation); Sockwell v. Blackburn, 748
F.2d 979, 981 (5th Cir. 1984) (no interrogation when police merely echoed question that vic-
tim of crime asked); United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 848-49 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (police
did not interrogate when suspect volunteered statements during casual conversation with po-
lice in police car); United States v. Morin, 665 F.2d 765, 770-71 (5th Cir. 1982) (police conduct
asking suspect if only remaining suitcase at airport belonged to him not admissible).
58. 678 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1982).
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applying Innis to their case. 59 The majority stated that the facts closely re-
sembled the facts in Innis and held that police had not interrogated the sus-
pect.60 The dissent disagreed because the police should have known that
their statement was likely to elicit an incriminating response from the sus-
pect, since the suspect knew the police were going to interrogate his girl-
friend next.61
Similarly, in State v. James62 the Arizona Supreme Court held that the
police did not interrogate the suspect when one police officer asked another
officer in the presence of a murder suspect if the police had learned where
the body was located. 63 The second officer, who had just interrogated the
suspect, responded that the suspect had invoked his right to counsel. The
suspect agreed, however, to tell where the victim was located. The court
allowed the incriminating statement as evidence at the suspect's trial.64 Jus-
tice Brennan dissented from the U.S. Supreme Court's denial of certiorari
because he believed the Court needed to clarify the application of Innis con-
cerning what constitutes the functional equivalent of interrogation. 65 In that
case the Arizona Supreme Court assumed no interrogation and assumed the
suspect waived his rights under Miranda.66 Brennan believed the Arizona
court erred when it failed to address whether interrogation existed. 67
After Innis, interrogation includes not only direct questioning of a sus-
pect, but also police actions that indirectly question the suspect. 68 If the
issue revolved only around whether the police asked the suspect a question,
the analysis would be easy. 69 The Innis definition goes further to include the
functional equivalent of interrogation, and so is more difficult to apply.70
The Miranda Court's goal was to protect the suspect's constitutional rights
from the compelling nature of custodial interrogation. 71 The Innis Court
provided a guideline for when the functional equivalent of interrogation oc-
59. Id. at 1337.
60. Id. at 1334-35. After reading Thierman his Miranda rights, police interrogated him
until he asked to see an attorney. When this interrogation terminated one police officer said to
the other, "That's it.... let's go talk to the girl," referring to Thierman's girlfriend. Thierman
then made an incriminating remark.
61. Id. at 1338 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
62. 141 Ariz. 141, 685 P.2d 1293 (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
63. 685 P.2d at 1297.
64, Id. at 1297-98.
65. James v. Arizona, 469 U.S. 990, 996 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
66. James, 141 Ariz. 141, 685 P.2d at 1297. As in Innis, the police officer in James was
speaking to another officer and not to the suspect, but in James the police had just subjected
the suspect to interrogation, and the suspect thought the police had directed the question to
him. In Innis the two police officers were clearly talking to each other and not to the suspect.
See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
67. James, 469 U.S. at 996 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
68. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301'(1980).
69. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966) (direct questioning clearly
interrogation).
70. 446 U.S. at 303 (officer's offhand remarks to each other not functional equivalent of
interrogation). But see id. at 306 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (police officer's statement that inno-
cent child could be hurt if child found weapon constituted appeal to conscience, which is
functional equivalent of interrogation).
71. 384 U.S. at 444.
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curs: police conduct that is likely to elicit an incriminating response.72
In addition to questions, the functional equivalent of interrogation in-
cludes statements that could call for a response from the suspect. 73 The
majority in Innis distinguished between statements specifically designed to
elicit an incriminating response and statements that by chance elicit an in-
criminating remark.74 Justice Stevens in his dissent would have created a
broader range of protection for the suspects by not requiring that the sus-
pect's remark be foreseeable.75
E. Voluntary Statements
The functional equivalent of interrogation is not so broad as to include all
statements a suspect makes to police after his arrest. The Miranda rule does
not preclude the admission of voluntary statements. 76 The Supreme Court
indicated in Michigan v. Mosely 77 that a suspect can even invoke his right to
silence and later still make a voluntary statement that is admissible in evi-
dence.78 In Edwards v. Arizona 79 the Court held that interrogation must
stop immediately when a suspect invokes his right to silence under the fifth
amendment.80 The Edwards case created a per se rule that interrogation
must immediately stop once a suspect asks to see an attorney before continu-
ing the interrogation.81 The Court has made it clear, however, that the sus-
pect can validly initiate further discussions with the police even after asking
for assistance from counsel.8 2
72. 446 U.S. at 301.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 301-02.
75. Id. at 311-12 (Stevens, ., dissenting).
[T]he definition of "interrogation" must include any police statement or conduct
that has the same purpose or effect as a direct question. Statements that appear
to call for a response from the suspect, as well as those that are designed to do
so, should be considered interrogation. By prohibiting only those relatively few
statements or actions that a police officer should know are likely to elicit an
incriminating response, the Court today accords a suspect considerably less
protection.
Id.
76. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478.
77. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
78. Id. at 104. The Supreme Court held that the police did not violate the rule of Mi-
randa in a second interrogation because (1) the police had properly stopped the first interroga-
tion immediately when asked, and (2) the second interrogation concerned a different type of
crime, a murder, rather than the initial crimes investigated, robberies. Id. at 106-07.
79. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
80. Id. at 485. The Court held that the suspect's confession was inadmissible because the
police had coerced the statement. Id.
81. Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 646 (1984); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1043
(1983).
82. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1044. The suspect asked the police, "What is going to happen
to me now?" after he had invoked his right to counsel. The Court held that the question
implied that the defendant wanted to have a "generalized discussion" about the alleged crime.
Id. at 1045-46. The police warned him again of his right to remain silent, but he chose to
waive his rights and talk to the police.
The dissent disagreed that the particular question evinced a desire for a discussion of the
crime. Instead the dissent asserted that the suspect merely wanted to know what immediate
events to anticipate. Id. at 1055 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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II. ARIZONA V. MAURO
In Arizona v. Mauro the Supreme Court clarified the meaning of interroga-
tion and its functional equivalent as set forth in Innis. 83 The Court reversed
the Arizona Supreme Court's decision, declaring that that court had misin-
terpreted the meaning of interrogation. 84 The majority stated that the facts
of this case, as compared to those in Innis, clearly showed that the police did
not interrogate Mauro at the time he made the statements in question. 85 In
Innis two police officers had a conversation with each other related to the
crime while riding with the suspect in the police car to the police station. In
Mauro the police merely allowed Mauro to meet with his wife. This meeting
occurred at the insistence of his wife, not at the suggestion of the police
officers.
The Court concentrated primarily on the police's intent, even though In-
nis emphasized that the main focus should be the suspect's perspective.
86
The Court noted, that even from the suspect's perspective, the police did not
interrogate Mauro.8 7 The basic aim of Miranda and Innis was to prevent the
police from compelling suspects to confess based on the custodial environ-
ment, and the circumstances under which Mauro incriminated himself did
not present such an environment.8 8
In addition, the Court found that the police could not foresee that Mauro
would incriminate himself.8 9 The police knew it was possible that either
Mauro or his wife might make an incriminating remark since this meeting
occurred after the death of their son.9° Innis, however, in the Court's view
requires more direct action on the part of the police for their conduct to
reach the functional equivalent of interrogation.9 The facts of this case,
according to the majority, did not meet Innis's legal standard for
interrogation.
92
The Court held that Mauro made the incriminating statement volun-
tarily.93 Mauro's invoking his right to remain silent did not prevent him
from making voluntary statements later.94 The Court followed the Edwards
rule that as long as the suspect initiates the conversation without any police
compulsion, the prosecution can use as evidence any statement the suspect
makes.95 The police did not initiate the conversation between Mauro and
83. 107 S. Ct. at 1934-35, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 466.
84. Id. at 1934, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 465.
85. Id. at 1936, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 468.
86. Id., 95 L. Ed. 2d at 467; see Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).
87. 107 S. Ct. at 1936, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 467. "We doubt that a suspect, told by officers that
his wife will be allowed to speak to him, would feel that he was being coerced to incriminate
himself in any way." Id.
88. Id. at 1936-37, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 468; Innis, 446 U.S. at 299.
89. 107 S. Ct. at 1936, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 467.
90. Id., 95 L. Ed. 2d at 467-68. "Officers do not interrogate a suspect simply by hoping
that he will incriminate himself." Id., 95 L. Ed. 2d at 468.
91. Id. at 1937, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 468.
92. Id. at 1936 n.6, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 468 n.6.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1934, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 466.
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his wife; the conversation occurred only at the wife's insistence. The police
acted properly in having an officer present.96 Since the police did not in any
way initiate or participate in the conversation, the Court held Mauro's state-
ments to be voluntary. 97
The Court held that the Arizona Supreme Court applied the standard of
conduct, "likely to elicit an incriminating response," too broadly.98 The Ar-
izona court viewed the inquiry as whether the particular circumstances
could lead to an incriminating response, rather than asking whether the po-
lice conduct in question was likely to produce an incriminating response.99
According to the Court, the police acted properly with Mauro.1c°
The Court did not address the argument that the Arizona Supreme Court
used reasoning under the sixth amendment to explain the fifth amendment
right against self-incrimination. 0 1 The Arizona court borrowed the reason-
ing used in sixth amendment right-to-counsel cases to explain the suspect's
status after he invokes his right to silence.' 0 2 In Innis the Court established
that the reasoning applied to sixth amendment right-to-counsel cases does
not apply equally to a fifth amendment case involving the right against self-
incrimination. 103 The Supreme Court, therefore, decided Mauro solely on
the fifth amendment. °4
Justice Stevens argued in the dissent that the meeting between husband
and wife was in fact a classic interrogation technique.' 05 According to Ste-
vens, the fact that the wife requested the meeting was irrelevant since the
police knew that the meeting was likely to elicit an incriminating response,
the very standard established in Innis.'06 Justice Stevens also argued that
the police allowed the meeting with the intent to gain an incriminating state-
ment.107 Agreeing with the Arizona Supreme Court, Justice Stevens be-
lieved that the police officers "exploited" the suspect, who, under the
circumstances, was virtually certain to make an incriminating statement.108
96. Id. at 1936, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 467.
97. Id., 95 L. Ed. 2d at 468.
98. Id. at 1936 n.6, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 468 n.6.
99. Id. at 1936, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 467.
100. Id. at 1937, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 468-69.
101. Id. at 1934, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 465; see State v. Mauro, 149 Ariz. 24, 716 P.2d 393, 400
(1986) (en banc). The Arizona court relied on the reasoning in Maine v. Moulton, 106 S. Ct.
477, 487, 88 L. Ed. 2d 481, 496 (1985) (contrasting chance encounters that produce incrimi-
nating statement with "knowing exploitation" by police). The Arizona court held the police
knowingly exploited Mauro since they required an officer be present when Mauro spoke to his
wife. Mauro, 716 P.2d at 401. The court distinguished Narten v. Eyman, 460 F.2d 184, 191
(9th Cir. 1969) (allowing testimony of police when police accidentally overheard suspect and
wife since police did not interrogate suspect). See Mauro 716 P.2d at 400, 401.
102. Mauro, 716 P.2d at 401.
103. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 n.4 (1980).
104. 107 S. Ct. at 1934, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 465.
105. Id. at 1937, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 469 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 1940, 95 L. Ed. at 472-73.
107. Id. at 1939, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 471.




The opinion in Arizona v. Mauro attempted to clarify the standard estab-
lished in Rhode Island v. Innis to determine the functional equivalent of in-
terrogation. The Innis Court established the definition, but split on the
application of that definition. The Mauro Court similarly split on the appli-
cation of the definition of the functional equivalent of interrogation. Even
though the Supreme Court has established a standard for the inquiry as to
whether interrogation exists, the inquiry is still a facts-and-circumstances
approach. The facts and circumstances can vary so greatly from case to case
that the Court cannot create a totally objective test with each possible influ-
encing factor listed. The cases can provide guidelines and broad principles
for the lower courts to look to when deciding whether interrogation exists.
Under Mauro and Innis interrogation exists if the police take an active
role to induce the incriminating remark. When police cannot foresee that a
suspect will respond to a remark made to another person or police officer,
the remark is not interrogation. If other persons make the remarks to which
the suspect responds, the remark is not interrogation. The test is whether a
police officer engaged in calculated conduct designed to induce an incrimi-
nating response.
The Court still looks to the same three considerations described in Innis to
determine if interrogation occurred, but whereas Innis weighed the suspect's
perspective heavily, Mauro relied more on the police's intent. A court can
look to either factor in deciding the case. The Court continues to decide
whether the suspect's self-incrimination was foreseeable in light of the
circumstances.
In Mauro the Court reiterated that voluntary statements continue to be
admissible as long as the suspect initiates the statement or conversation
without police coercion. The fifth amendment protects suspects from police
coercion and not from their own voluntary statements. The Court, in re-
jecting the Arizona Supreme Court's reasoning, showed that fifth amend-
ment cases are distinct from sixth amendment cases, even though the issue of
interrogation may occur in both.
Eleshea Dice Lively
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